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TRADITIONAL MECHANISMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
IN MODERN AFRICA: THE BODIOR RITUAL AND THE 
ENDURING KROUMEN VERSUS LOBI-DAGARA CONFLICT 
IN SOUTHERN CÔTE D’IVOIRE
Alfred BABO
International Studies/Sociology and Anthropology Department, Fairfield University 
ABSTRACT  The article examines the unexplored challenging role of youth in the traditional 
approaches of conflict resolution in Africa. Using Côte d’Ivoire as a case study, this article 
explores the relationship between intergenerational roles and conflict resolution. Traditionalist 
anthropologists tend to found the strength of the customary mechanisms on the dexterity and 
knowledge of elders, but serious doubt remains about the effectiveness of this traditional 
practice. In Côte d’Ivoire, as young Kroumen challenge their own traditions of peacemaking, 
they hinder the efficiency of customary approaches to resolve the 1999 conflict between the 
Kroumen and the Lobi-Dagara. In 2006 the Kroumen ritual of Bodior was performed and was 
supposed to seal reconciliation and social cohesion after the deadly conflict but, recent field-
work reveals lingering mistrust and tensions 10 years after this ritual. 
Key Words: Conflict; Côte d’Ivoire; Youth; Traditions; Rituals; Conflict resolution.
INTRODUCTION
Intrinsically, the culture of prevention and conflict resolution has been a 
dominant feature of life in traditional Africa. Customary institutions in African 
conflict regulation are experiencing a revival along with debates about their effec-
tiveness in the current modern environment. Discussions about mechanisms of 
conflict resolution on the African continent have long opposed traditionalists to 
modernists. On the one hand, traditionalists affirm that indigenous rituals, palaver 
institutions, and proverbs prevent and resolve local, inter-regional, and inter- 
communal conflicts (Niane, 2005; Diouf, 2005; Tamba, 2016; Ntahombaye, 1999; 
Bah, 1999). Scholars of this traditional approach praise institutions such as 
Sanankouya in Mali, which is a “joking alliance” as well as inter-clan marriage 
and extended matrimonial alliances that foster mediation, diplomacy and peace-
building (Konaté, 1999). On the other hand, modernists argue that these patriar-
chal traditional systems often silence voices of women and youth and instead 
emphasize the key role of elders (Mattes, 1997; Logan, 2008; Mawere & Mayekiso, 
2014). Beyond the cleavage, other studies have articulated a hybrid peacemaking 
approach of conflict resolution on the continent (Fanthorpe, 2006; Mac Ginty & 
Richmond, 2007; Young, 1995). For example, Mac Ginty’s (2010) concept of 
“hybrid peace” incorporates both external internationally-based interventions and 
local traditions and actors to seek effective solution to crises. This article focuses 
on local actors, especially young people who, despite their active role in the onset 
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and unfolding of crises, are often ignored in the resolution process. It argues that 
the youth whose knowledge of both traditional and modern rules influences vil-
lage affairs are a critical component of the study of the traditional mechanisms 
of peacemaking on the continent.
I use the Bodior ritual case in Tabou (South-West of Côte d’Ivoire) to exam-
ine the intergenerational tensions that surround customary management of social 
conflict in Africa by describing the increasing agency of the youth. Ethnographies 
of peoples in western Côte d’Ivoire have shown the implementation of traditions 
over the modern judiciary system, especially in the management of land conflicts. 
Traditions relied on elderly authorities to perform rituals to make a durable peace 
(Chauveau & Dozon, 1985; Chauveau, 2000; Koné & Chauveau, 1998). However 
in the 1990s, the youth increasingly resisted to the customary management of 
community conflicts. In numerous conflicts between autochthones and immigrants, 
youth living in rurality demanded the departure of the settlers as the only solu-
tion instead of traditional arrangements made by elders. In the December 1999 
conflict between Ivorian Kroumen and immigrant Lobi-Dagara (from Burkina- 
Faso), young people raised up their resistance to the customary arbitration. Out 
of respect for the Kroumen tradition, the Bodior ritual—the one last not to be 
contested by anyone—was undertaken with the firm conviction by all that this 
sacred institution will definitively seal peace between Kroumen and Lobi-Dagara. 
Nevertheless, in spite of its traditional power, the Bodior was contested by young 
Kroumen in the Hompo tribe. 
Today’s African youth bear multiple and composite identities mustered by both 
rurality and urbanity, tradition and modernity (Mbembe, 1985). The complex iden-
tities are also affected by an involuntary delay in the adulthood accomplishment 
(job, marriage, family) that Honwana (2013: 3) called “waithood”. Economic, 
social and political crisis have also shaped young people struggle to gain a social 
status (Honwana & De Boek, 2005), as well as to question the domination of 
elder generation (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999). Thus, generational conflicts arise 
based on the gap between seniors’ political promises and the disillusion of the 
economic precariousness and unemployment facing young people (Golaz et al., 
2016). In Côte d’Ivoire, numerous studies characterize youth populations as polit-
ically violent (Banegas, 2007). Young people in many western rural communities 
contest familial authority, and the presence of immigrant communities (Chauveau 
& Bobo, 2003; Chauveau, 2005; Bobo, 2010; Crook, 2007). With the economic 
and political crisis, youth struggle to transform local economy by introducing new 
crops and taking over familial land (Babo & Droz, 2008).  
In spite of their active involvement—either as victims or perpetrators—in the 
outbreak of land and intercommunity conflicts in rural areas, little is said about 
youth perspectives in the success or failure of customary peacemaking. Reynolds 
and Acio (2017) state that since youth generally do not have voice in land mat-
ters; youth roles in conflict resolution related to land is ignored. Research on the 
Kroumen and Lobi-Dagara conflict of Tabou has not explored to what extent the 
young generation(1) of Kroumen confront the most sacred ritual of conflict reso-
lution of this group. Youth ability to challenge the Bodior ritual has to be explored 
because of the increasingly role played at the familial and community level in 
85Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution in Modern Africa
the Kroumen society. Rural youth shaped by both traditional and modern rules 
must be incorporated into contemporary scholarship on peacemaking. By analyz-
ing the actions of this important portion of the population, this article examines 
the factors that may hinder or consolidate traditional approaches of conflict reso-
lution in Africa. 
The research relies upon qualitative data. I first conducted fieldwork in 2005, 
and later in 2010, carrying out an observation study and interviews in the two 
Kroumen epicenter villages of Bésséréké and Ouéguiré. After establishing infor-
mal relationships with respondents, and in accordance with the ever volatile envi-
ronment, I interviewed individuals as well as groups of elders and young people 
in both communities. In each village, I led focus groups with young men while 
I carried out one-on-one interviews with the chief of the village, the customary 
landholder, and the other elders. Travelling back and forth from one village to 
another offered opportunities to chat with people. I organized a community meet-
ing that gather the village. I was then able to observe the conflictual interactions 
between young men and elders. With villagers, I also visited immigrants aban-
doned farms. At that time, I only met the displaced Dagara and Lobi in the town 
of Tabou because they were not allowed to go back to villages and settlements. 
Very recently, in fall 2016, due to an alleged shift in the relationship between 
immigrants and autochthons, I sent a team of assistant researchers to the same 
villages and to Tabou to gather updated data. Interviews conducted by the team 
were with local authorities, young men of Kroumen community, and non-native 
Burkinabè community leaders. The team met first the local authorities in Tabou 
to get the general picture of the situation. Then, they headed the villages where 
they met individually young people and members of the chiefdom. 
BACKGOUND AND RECALL OF THE TABOU INTERCOMMUNITY CON-
FLICT 
Agriculture is by far the dominant economic activity in the Tabou region, 
accounting for almost 98 percent of its wealth. The perennial crops include, cocoa, 
coffee, rubber and palm. Cocoa is the mainstay of the Ivorian economy and pro-
vides more than half of its GDP. The contribution by the South-West zone in 
cocoa production is 34 percent of national output and 15 percent of world pro-
duction (Tano, 2012). The dynamism of agriculture attracted populations from 
other regions of Côte d’Ivoire and nationals of West African countries. Apart from 
autochthons, the arrival of migrants occurred in waves since 1970, primarily 
because of the availability of wild forest favorable to flourishing cocoa farming. 
The inhabitants of Tabou areas consist of autochthones groups namely Kroumen 
who were mostly committed to activities on sea during the colonial period 
(Schwartz, 1980). As a result, they were engaged in only small-scale subsistence 
agriculture. After the independence of the country in 1960, the first president 
Houphouet-Boigny encouraged the exploitation of a huge reservoir of Tabou for-
est for cocoa production. Numerous allochthones, non-native peoples from other 
parts of Côte d’Ivoire, including Central (Baoulé), Eastern (Agni) and Northern 
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(Sénoufo, Tagbana, etc.) migrated to the Tabou region and the nearby towns of 
San-Pedro, Grabo, and Grand-Bereby. In the 1970s, migration intensified with 
immigrants from countries of the sub-region such as Burkina-Faso, Mali, Togo, 
Benin, etc. 
Migrant populations settled in the region and built relationships with autoch-
thones communities on the basis of the so-called ‘tutorat.’(2) Tutorat is a “land 
agreement” feature of the “moral economy” practiced within West African peas-
ant societies (Chauveau, 2006). However in Tabou, like in all forest regions of 
western and south-western Côte d’Ivoire, this economic model entered into crisis 
in the early 1980s, which worsened in the early 1990s. Migrants tried to free 
themselves from the tutorat after they gained financial power through the cocoa 
economy. Over years, the distribution of assets (land, plantations, and money) 
was controlled by non-natives of the region. As the dependency relationships 
between migrants and their autochthon “guardians” reversed, intercommunity ten-
sions arose (Babo & Droz, 2008; Babo, 2012). Later in the mid-1990s, the nar-
row nationalism promoted by the government to rule access to land, power and 
other social and political rights through the concept of ivoirité exacerbated the 
existing strains. Ivoirité, an ethnic-based and xenophobic ideology inspired state 
authorities when crafting the 1998 Land Act that excluded property rights for 
immigrants. The Act prompted intercommunity conflicts in the West of the coun-
try. It is against this backdrop that the deadly conflict between Kroumen and 
Lobi-Dagara occurred in late 1999.    
According to elder M. Sawadogo of the Burkinabè community, on November 
13, 1999 a clash occurred between an immigrant Lobi and one young autoch-
thone  Kroumen in the village of Bésséréké over a piece of land.(3) The fight 
resulted in the death of the autochthone. In the all villages in the large Hompo 
tribe, the Kroumen called for retaliation. They attacked the settlements colloqui-
ally called “campements” of two Burkinabè Lobi and Dagara communities. The 
events shook the region, and villages in the other regional tribes followed what 
had quickly become the rule: chasing and ousting the Burkinabè farmers from 
the region. The clashes caused dozens of deaths as local security forces were 
overwhelmed by the uprisings. More than 20,000 Burkinabè farmers were forced 
to leave their plantations. Some of these displaced people initially headed to sur-
rounding villages in the towns of Tabou, Grand-Béréby and San-Pedro while about 
15,000, especially women and children, went back home in Burkina-Faso.(4) 
CUSTOMARY MANAGEMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LOBI-
DAGARA AND KROUMEN
In Ivorian rural areas, the modern judiciary system and customary rules have 
long overlapped but with a predominance of the latter in daily social relations. 
The management of land conflict falls primarily under traditional regulations of 
village affairs. Only when traditional arbitration fails, do people go to law enforce-
ment (gendarmerie) and state officials (sous-prefect and prefect). In the traditional 
Kroumen process, like in the Hompo tribe where the conflict started, it is the 
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chief of village and members of the chiefdom who rule first the resolution of 
any conflicts (Schwartz, 1999). The matter is submitted to the arbitration of the 
tribal authority if one of the parties is not satisfied with the judgment at the vil-
lage level. According to traditional rules, a murderer is banished from the village 
for a period of seven years, and his or her possessions are destroyed and/or 
burned down. As the elders we interviewed affirmed, expulsion in the Kroumen 
custom offers moral satisfaction, which strives to soothe the resentment of the 
victim’s family. In addition, the rule aims to calm the anger of the autochthon’s 
ancestors whose universe is stained by the blood of one of their descendants, and 
thus avoiding collective punishment. In the Kroumen tribes, traditional peacemak-
ing encompasses violence, sacrifices, and negotiations with the family of the 
deceased at the end of the period of banishment for the eventual return of the 
perpetrator. At that moment, the perpetrator’s family offers animals for immola-
tion during the Bodior ritual to seal peace. 
I. Predominance of Traditional Kroumen Rules
Relations between national and local authorities have always been determinant 
in the management of land tenure (Sara, 2017). After the clashes broke out 
between Burkinabè planters and the Kroumen in the village of Bésséréké, vio-
lence quickly spread across the region. In response, the government of President 
Konan Bédié engaged in negotiations with the two communities to bring back 
peace. The autochthones claimed their traditions to resolve the conflict. At that 
time, the narrow nationalism was also a xenophobic propaganda that as of 1994 
mainly targeted Burkinabè living in Côte d’Ivoire (Babo, 2017). In addition, in 
1999 the state was weakened by the country’s first coup d’état. As the govern-
ment’s authority was hindered by instability the management of the land conflict 
in Tabou fell under the traditional regulations of village and tribe affairs. 
Following the Hompo tribe traditions, the parents of the Kroumen victim sought 
arbitration before the chief of Bésséréké village and members of his committee 
who constitute the first institution to engage in the resolution of such conflicts. 
Later, the whole village sent the case before the chief of the Hompo tribe. It 
reached this tribal level because even though the Lobi-Dagara argued that the 
perpetrator acted in self-defense, according to the autochthons they were protect-
ing the murderer. The issue, then, reached all Hompo villages. Moreover, claim-
ing the occupation of their lands by foreigners, traditional authorities of the Hompo 
extended the conflict to the entire Kroumen tribes in the Tabou region. Accord-
ingly, the heads of all villages and tribes(5) met in late 1999 in the village 
Djamatéké within a “high customary court” set up especially for the occasion. 
The trial took place in the absence of the Burkinabè who had fled, but instead 
with the presence of the local leaders of the main political parties, and especially 
the youth who endorsed and supported the court. As they upheld their sacred 
custom that prohibits any drop of blood to be spilled on the soil of their ances-
tors, the traditional authorities ultimately concluded that Lobi-Dagara were to be 
expelled from all Kroumen villages for seven years. 
This banishment revealed the ethnonationalistic dimension of the conflict to 
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control land. In the aftermath of their decision, Kroumen local leaders told the 
representative of the government, “They [the Lobi and Dagara] are foreigners, 
they should go. They should leave the lands of our ancestors”.(6) However, the 
solution to punish a whole community, instead of the only perpetrator did not 
resolve the conflict, because the banned Burkinabè were asking to get access to 
their farms and pleading to return back in their settlements. 
II. Extension of the conflict and Bodior ritual for reconciliation
After their expulsion from the Kroumen tribes of Tabou in December 1999, 
while thousands Burkinabè returned home, others scattered in the nearby areas 
of Grabo, Grand-Bereby and San Pedro. From these places, expulsed farmers 
were expecting a rapid peaceful resolution to return to their “campements”. Oth-
ers, frustrated by the decision, pushed by sidestepping the ban and attempting to 
access their farms. This resistance created more clashes as Kroumen argued that 
Burkinabè did not comply with their customs. In September 2000, another land 
dispute opposed Burkinabè to their Kroumen hosts in San-Pedro resulting in the 
evacuation of a thousand Burkinabè (Bredeloup, 2006; Schwartz, 1999). As of 
2000, regarding the ongoing intercommunity tensions in the South-West region, 
the government of President Laurent Gbagbo tried to find a durable solution. 
Using the “national peace day” of November 15, 2001, the minister Emile Boga 
Doudou offered his mediation and tried another round of negotiations to concili-
ate the Kroumen and Lobi-Dagara communities by visiting traditional authorities 
of San Pedro et Tabou regions.  
However, the evolution of the national political crisis worsened local tensions. 
The rebellion that broke out in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2002 was prepared 
and launched from Burkina-Faso (Banegas & Otayek, 2003). Against this back-
drop, the young Kroumen radicalized their positions about the ban and started to 
suggest the idea of a “definitive ban” of the Lobi-Dagara. In 2005, six years after 
the expulsion, the Inter-ministerial Crisis Committee, which was created by both 
the Ivorian and Burkinabè governments after the events of Tabou in 1999 was 
reactivated (Bredeloup, 2006). As the ban was reaching its end, officials of the 
two countries undertook mediation missions towards the two communities in con-
flict. In the course of the discussions, the Ivorian authorities appealed to 
Kroumen’s forgiveness and acceptance of the return of the Burkinabè farmers in 
the region. After tough negotiations, an agreement in principle was reached. The 
following year, in 2006, which was the seventh year of ban, a solemn ceremony 
to seal the reconciliation held in Tabou gathered Kroumen and Burkinabè. At this 
occasion, in presence of both the Ivorian Minister Danon Djédjé and the 
Ambassador of Burkina-Faso in Côte d’Ivoire, Emile Ilboudo, the Kroumen cus-
tomary authorities officially lifted the ban against the Burkinabè farmers.
This ceremony, in spite of the presence of state authorities, was carried out 
within the true Kroumen tradition. In fact, “Our ambassador has even offered 
four beef for reconciliation feast” as part of the Kroumen Bodior cayou rites 
recalls Bangré Lamoussa,(7) a Burkinabè representative. According to M. Ouellé, 
the chief of Bésséréké village, the Bodior cayou incarnates both the mystic guide 
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and the institution that manage the resolution of the conflict in the Kroumen 
tribe. (8) The Bodior as an individual is the only one who convenes people for the 
arbitration trial or reconciliation rites. He is the most powerful and customary 
authority whose decision cannot be disputed or denied by any party in conflict. 
Thus, when hosting the ceremony in December 2006, he required from the 
Burkinabè community the four animals for immolation and two bottles of liquor 
that he used for libations and other incantations to plead with the ancestors for 
forgiveness. The Bodior as an institution is a ritual that encompassed two sides, 
one secret and the other public. In the secrecy, the Bodior and his assistants 
slaughtered the animals. The blood was poured on the soil along with incanta-
tions as a symbol of the guilty Burkinabè perpetrator of murder, along with his 
community, and his request for mercy from the parents of the autochthon victim. 
Parts of the meat of the animals were then cooked very quickly in a light sauce 
and shared only by the Bodior and his companions.(9) Another part of the meat 
was then cooked with red palm oil and dedicated to the ancestors. At this stage 
of the ritual, according to the elders, women were allowed neither to attend nor 
to eat this first meal. As for the public facet of the ritual, the meat was distrib-
uted to all families to cook and share with all village members. At this point, 
both the victim and perpetrators’ families shared and ate the meal to cement rec-
onciliation. Through this ritual, members of the two communities agreed to put 
an end to the desire for revenge and to grant each other forgiveness to foster a 
sustainable return to social cohesion. 
Adler (1982: 153) presents revenge as the obligation of a particular group– 
family, lineage, and clan–to get compensation for the blood shed by one of its 
members. Thus, the symbolic characteristic of blood for blood through animal 
immolation within the Bodior aimed to definitely prevent any acts of revenge. In 
the aftermath of the ritual, Dagara and Lobi farms were restored in most villages, 
and life somehow returned to normal. Even in several settlements around the vil-
lage of Bésséréké, where the crisis started in 1999, some Burkinabè farmers were 
allowed to return to their farms. Nevertheless, the peace did not wipe out resent-
ment that was ingrained in the villages of the Hompo tribe where Burkinabè 
planters were still strongly rejected, especially by the young people. 
YOUTH AND THE CHALLENGE OF TRADITIONAL MECHANISMS 
Since 2006, several Burkinabè once pariahs, were able to return to their farms 
where they had been hunted. According to Mr. Nemlin Hiné, Permanent Secre-
tary General of the Peace Committee,(10) “Peace returns everywhere in the other 
tribes except, unfortunately, in villages of the Hompo tribe, where we face obsta-
cles which are intimately linked to the absence of junction” (Traoré, 2010: 1). 
Despite the sacred essence of the ritual, young people of Hompo tribe dared to 
defy it. The youth not only expressed negative opinion about their elders’ action, 
but they also rationally criticized the Bodior ritual itself. The young men acknowl-
edged that by contesting the ritual they do not comply with the traditions, which 
state that the expulsed can return after the time of banishment through sacrifices. 
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In the area of the conflict, relations among the uneducated elders and literate 
youth has shifted based on youth critics in regard to their open grievances and 
critiques. On the one hand, parents and older generations lost their authority over 
their children and the youth in the wake of the long and complex economic, 
social and political crisis in the country (Buono & Babo, 2013). Most of these 
young men are educated and have been urban migrants for years before return-
ing to their villages. In their families, young men expressed discontent towards 
the elders, who they accused of sorcery, blaming them for misfortune during their 
migration in cities. Moreover, young people criticized traditional chiefs and heads 
of lineage for their selfishness and charged them with corruption for selling off 
or gifting away the land without familial agreement. One young man from Bés-
séréké said, “We are in this village, but we don’t have any plot for farming 
because our parents have handed over the family land for free to outsiders”.(11) 
On the other hand, young Kroumen settled in villages relied on their acknowl-
edgement of both customary rules and the 1998 Land Act to strongly claim the 
control of the land tenure. The younger generation referred to their knowledge 
of the traditions in their firm stance against the ritual. In 2008, two years after 
the rites of Bodior were performed, young people’s position radicalized in 
Bésséréké, Klatoué, Déhié and Djourou, and they refused to accept the return of 
the Lobi-Dagara in the Hompo tribe. A returnee, Sidiki Sawadogo, who tried to 
access his plantation in the village of Djourou explains: “Young Kroumen attacked 
me on my plantation and beat me bloody.”(12) The autochthons explained this 
extreme reaction by arguing that during the time of the ban, some Lobi-Dagara 
hid in the forest of Grand-Bereby (North of Tabou) and launched raids to Hompo 
villages. These expulsed Lobi-Dagara committed violence against the Kroumen 
in retaliation of what they considered an unjust expulsion. The immigrants we 
interviewed acknowledged that some among them who might have carried out 
the attacks had difficulty to comply with the Kroumen’s ban custom to resolve 
a conflict. For many young Kroumen the immigrants’ attitude challenged and 
undermined autochthon’s traditions. Undermining their traditions represents the 
greatest danger to the existence of their tribe as a social group. The attitude of 
defiance by Lobi-Dagara had therefore fueled the intransigence of the Kroumen 
youth who called for a definitive ban of Burkinabè from their villages. 
At the heart of their traditional rite, the Kroumen elderly incorporate the risk 
of death for those who do not respect the pact of the conciliation. In spite of 
this, the negotiations and appeals to respect the word, the institution and the 
appeasement action of traditional authorities have been exhausted since the youth 
in the Hompo tribe refused to seal peace with the Burkinabè. Young Kroumen 
people fulfilled of resentment requested that Burkinabè stay away from their vil-
lages to avoid bloody clashes. According to the young men we interviewed, it is 
clear that new deadly fights would end up into a new expulsion still based on 
the Kroumen tradition. For the youth, the Bodior does not consider their voice 
or concerns about land access. The ritual allowed the return of the Lobi-Dagara 
to their lands, which were occupied and exploited by these youth for seven years. 
The defiant attitude of young Kroumen is based on their belief that the banned 
Burkinabè would never come back from the exile in their homeland Burkina- 
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Faso. The youth’s position of contention can thus be analyzed in the perspective 
of their desire to reconquer the land that their parents ceded decades ago to 
Lobi-Dagara farmers within the ambiguous tutorat. They still refuse to let the 
Lobi-Dagara go back to their farms. Therefore, for the youth the Bodior ritual 
that happened in 2006 did not solve the original cause of the conflict: the diffi-
cult access to land for the young Kroumen. The ritual represents a symbol of 
subjugation to outsiders that they do not agree with. In their sights, complying 
with the rite is a way to lose the opportunity to renegotiate property rights of 
their familial lands.  
Besides traditions, young people in the Hompo villages also relied on their 
knowledge of the modern land rules to contest the power and symbolism of the 
Bodior ritual and the subsequent return of the immigrants to their farms. During 
our focus groups, many educated young men have repeatedly referred to the 1998 
Land Act that affirms “Only Ivorian nationals can claim land property”(13) to hold 
their position against the Bodior ritual. Strategies against the ritual included con-
tinuous occupation of immigrant’ lands. Young Kroumen know that by creating 
conditions for litigation over a parcel of land, they can stop its exploitation by 
the administrative authority until a solution is found. As long as the case is pend-
ing before the modern local administration, the Burkinabè farmers could not access 
and exploit the land. In 2016, ten years after the Bodior ritual was performed, 
the strategy has prevented many Lobi-Dagara farmers from taking back lands in 
the Hompo tribe. Approximately 2,000 hectares of plantations belonging to over 
200 Burkinabè farmers are still held (sold or exploited) by Kroumen in the vil-
lages of Djourou and Dehi in the Hompo tribe.(14)
Youth have also politically engaged in the national crisis, which empowered 
their position and served to challenge the ritual. During the military rebellion that 
broke out in 2002 with the support of Burkina-Faso authorities, Kroumen youth 
built up their legitimacy in the community arena by setting up self-defense com-
mittees and organized pro-government militia called “Jeunes patriotes” (‘young 
patriots’). The activism of young men of Bésséréké and Ouéguiré in this politi-
cal movement as of 2002 resulted in hatred discourses and attitudes towards the 
Burkinabè immigrants. Through their commitment to the national cause, youth 
gained leadership positions in the management of the public and village affairs. 
The young patriots became powerful leaders without whom nothing would be 
possible. For any community actions, local authorities, political leaders, and exter-
nal interveners would more and more consider to interact with the group of young 
people, including the young patriots. In some villages like in Bésséréké, Ouéguiré 
and Klatoué, they even reached prominent roles as chief or members of the chief-
dom. Henceforth, young people found themselves in a position to challenge the 
authority of traditional institution, the Bodior ritual that sealed the reintegration 
of the Burkinabè. 
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CONCLUSION
Traditionalists like Wiredu (2010) provides a defense of African tradition by 
pointing out the efficacy of the traditional mechanisms of governance including 
resolution of conflicts. In the 1999 Tabou conflict, the Bodior traditional ritual 
acknowledged by the state authorities brought back peace between Kroumen and 
Burkinabè Lobi-Dagara. In the aftermath, most immigrant farmers retrieved their 
farms and their settlements. 
However, despite the enforcement of this traditional mechanism to solve an old 
conflict, tensions are still alive and latent. The Bodior ritual and its deep-rooted 
strength as a symbol to seal peace did not prevent young Kroumen of the Hompo 
tribe from rejecting the return of the Burkinabè to their farms. In villages, the 
feeling of rejection is evident through the grievance, critics, and frustrations of 
youth that served to defy elders and their ritual. The suspicion among the two 
communities is prevalent. The disagreement between young people and Kroumen 
elders focuses on the fact that the ritual did not contribute to resolving their dif-
ficulties concerning land access. For the youth, the Bodior built peace by enforc-
ing the return of the expulsed Lobi-Dagara farmers, while it did not address how 
young men would access to land, how they should think as a community to share 
peacefully the increasingly scarce land.  
In regards to the Ivorian conflict resolution, the legitimacy of traditional author-
ities and the power of customary mechanisms are challenged by youth who no 
longer trust their traditional leaders. It appeared that in the resolution process the 
traditional mechanisms must treat not only the effects but also the causes of con-
flict. In the contemporary society, customary peacemaking should also integrate 
the youth who have gained social and political positions in village leadership as 
well as their perspectives that have been shaped by a combination of knowledge 
of traditions and laws for resolving conflicts over land access.     
NOTES
(1) In this paper by “youth” I refer to young males as villagers themselves presented this 
group during the fieldwork in the region. The term “youth” in the Kroumen social cate-
gorization doesn’t include females. Young females are incorporated into either the cate-
gory “children” or “women”.  
(2) Its principle is that any beneficiary of a delegation of land rights contracts a permanent 
duty vis-à-vis recognition of her/his “guardian.” In return, the land assignment requires 
the beneficiary to show some gratitude, “gift-cons” that embody the moral duty that 
sealed the alliance between the autochthones and the migrants.
(3) Interviews with chief of Ouéguiré village and see also http://lebel.centerblog.
net/6459415-Conflit-foncier-de-Tabou (Accepted on November 15, 2017)
(4) 75 to 80% of women and children, according to the CONASUR (National Committee of 
Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation).
(5) Bloga, Bapo, Plapo, Tépo Sud, Tépo-Nord, Trépo, Touo, Ourouboué, and Tahoux.
(6) Fieldwork, 2005.
(7) http://lebel.centerblog.net/6459415-Conflit-foncier-de-Tabou (Accepted on November 
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15, 2017).
(8) Fieldwork, Bésséréké, 2016.
(9) Idem.
(10) A structure under the direct authority of the Prefect of Tabou region.
(11) Fieldwork, Bésséréké, 2016.
(12) http://lebel.centerblog.net/6459415-Conflit-foncier-de-Tabou (Accepted on November 
15, 2017).
(13) Article 1 of the law 98-750 of December 23, 1998 states that only Ivorian nationals can 
claim land property rights. 
(14) http://lebel.centerblog.net/6459415-Conflit-foncier-de-Tabou (Accepted on November 
15, 2017).
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